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1 Introduction
Many central banks claim to be forward-looking in their policy actions. In practice, this amounts
to targeting conditional forecasts of the feedback variables reecting macroeconomic conditions.
Clarida et al. (1998 and 2000) present empirical evidence of this forward-looking behavior for
several monetary authorities including the Federal Reserve. They estimate a forward-looking
Taylor-type rule
it = it 1 + Ett+h + Etxt+q; (1)
where  captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, such that current period interest rates
(it) respond gradually to lead values of ination (t+h) and a measure of the output gap (xt+q),
corresponding to targeting horizons h and/or q > 0. Interest-rate feedback rules of this type are
extensively discussed in the literature (see Woodford, 2003, for example) and mimic monetary
policy behavior reasonably well.
Nevertheless, the analysis and implementation of this type of rule raises di¢ culties. First,
it is clear that the targeting horizon1 h should be viewed as part of the parameter set f; ; g
dening policy choices. Yet when attempting to replicate the behavior of central banks, research-
ers estimating policy rules do not directly estimate h, instead xing it at particular horizons.
Values for h may be determined either by their implied stabilization properties in specic macro
models2, or simply chosen at horizons purported to represent central bankspolicies. Levin et
al. (2003), for example, compute ten forecast-based optimized rules used in policy analysis or
studied by academic researchers, reporting forecast horizons ranging from from 2 to 15 quarters.
This suggests considerable uncertainty concerning the degree of forward-lookingness that central
banks should pursue. Second, standard forward-looking rules have been shown to su¤er from
indeterminacy (Batini et al. 2006, Levin et al., 2003, Woodford 2003), implying that in the face
of a macroeconomic shock, the number of paths leading back to equilibrium for real variables
is innite. This problem worsens as the forecast horizon increases, and the rule becomes less
persistent.
This paper adopts an empirical strategy which has the potential to circumvent the obstacles
described above. We discuss how a Calvo-typeforecast based rule (hereafter Calvo-rule) can be
used to estimate the degree of forward-lookingness. This rule, which is based on a discounted
sum of current and all future ination rates, has recently been proposed by Levine et al (2007),
1For brevity, we focus on the case of identical targeting horizons, i.e., h = q.
2See Batini and Nelson (2001) or Giannoni and Woodford (2003) for a discussion along these lines.
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who demonstrate its lower susceptibility to indeterminacy and better stabilization properties
than conventional rules. Thus, we simultaneously obtain a direct estimate of h, while adopting
a formulation that is theoretically more appealing.
2 Calvo-Rules
The rule we examine falls within a broader class of rule referred to in the literature as Ination
Forecast Based (IFB) rules. Despite their susceptibility to indeterminacy, such rules have strong
intuitive appeal, and the arguments in support of them are well known. First, as monetary policy
maximally impacts ination with a considerable lag, it follows that policy decisions should target
a horizon where the expected macroeconomic impact is judged greatest. Second, by targeting
forecasts, IFB rules implicitly draw upon a wide array of information relating to both current
and future macroeconomic conditions. In light of these arguments, the development of IFB rules
which are less susceptible to indeterminacy is desirable. The Calvo rule is such an innovation.
Suppose the interest-rate rule is written as
it = it 1 + t + 	t; (2)
where
t = (1  ')Et(t + 't+1 + '2t+2 + ::::); 0 < ' < 1 (3)
	t = (1  )Et(xt + xt+1 + 2xt+2 + ::::); 0 <  < 1
where  denotes the policymakers response to deviations from an output target, ' and  meas-
ure the extent to which current and all future ination rates and output gaps are discounted,
respectively. This formulation is akin to Calvo-type contracts (Calvo, 1983) commonly used in
New Keynesian Phillips curves. In what follows, we will assume ' =  , as this facilitates direct
estimation of the rule. Also, it is not unrealistic to expect central banks to have similar targeting
horizons for ination and output gaps.
The Calvo rule can be interpreted as a feedback from expected ination and output gap
forecasts that continues at any one period with probability '; switching o¤ with probability
1   '. The probability of the rule lasting for h periods is (1   ')'h, hence the mean forecast
horizon is (1  ')P1h=1 h'h = '=(1  '). With ' = 0:5, for example, we would have a Taylor
rule as in (1) with one period lead in ination (h = 1).
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This rule can also be seen as a special case of a Taylor-type rule that targets h-step-ahead
expected rates of ination and output gap forecasts (with h = 1; 2; :::;1)
it = it 1 + 0t + 1Ett+1 + 2Ett+2 + :::+ 0xt + 1xt+1 + 2xt+2 + :::; (4)
albeit one that imposes a specic structure on the is and is (i.e., a weighted average of future
variables with geometrically declining weights). This has an intuitive appeal and interpretation,
reecting monetary policy in an uncertain environment: the more distant the h-step ahead
forecast, the less reliable it becomes, hence the less weight it receives.
Another interesting feature of this specication type is that, conveniently rewritten, it per-
mits direct estimation of the mean lead horizon. In order to estimate the rule, rst express (3)
with ' =  as
t = (1  ')t + 'Ett+1 (5)
	t = (1  ')xt + 'Et	t+1
Then, using (5) it is possible to manipulate (2) to give
it =

1 + '
it 1 +
'
1 + '
Et(it+1) +
(1  ')
1 + '
t +
(1  ')
1 + '
xt (6)
One can also consider the case of outcome-based output gap targeting, by replacing 	t with
xt in (2), so that only future values of (predicted) ination are considered. The rule may be
written as
it =

1 + '
it 1 +
'
1 + '
Et(it+1) +
(1  ')
1 + '
t +

1 + '
[xt   'Et(xt+1)] (7)
We can then estimate the parameter coe¢ cients of (6) and (7) using GMM as explained next.
3 Empirical Analysis
Levine et al. (2007) analyze the more restrictive strictination forecast rule (imposing  = 0),
in the context of a DSGE model for the Euro Area. For the US case, however, an extended,
exible rule with the output gap as feedback variable seems more appropriate in order to
replicate the Feds behavior. Hence to estimate the reaction function implied (2), we follow the
now standard strategy outlined by Clarida et al. (1998 and 2000). We augment (6) and (7) by
introducing a random policy shock "t that accounts for forecast errors or interest rate deviations
from the level prescribed by the rule. If we assume that the shocks are orthogonal to any variable
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in the information set at time t 1, we can estimate the parameters of (6) and (7) by GMM using
the moment conditions implied by each equation. In particular, we employ the iterative GMM
estimator, with a weighting matrix using the Bartlett kernel, with an automated lag-length
selection procedure as in Andrews (1991). We also consider the Continuous-Updating GMM
estimator (CUE), which possesses superior large and nite sample properties when compared to
the standard GMM estimator, as discussed in Newey and Smith (2004).
Our estimations are based on two di¤erent vintages of US quarterly data. We use ex-post
revised data covering the period 1960:1-2004:4, in essence an updated version of Clarida et al.
(2000). The interest rate is dened as the average Federal Funds rate, ination is the annualized
quarterly rate of change of the GDP deator: Regarding the output gap, we use two measures:
the output gap constructed by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO), as well the quadratically
detrended unemployment rate, as in Clarida et al. (2000). The set of instruments comprises 4
lags of the model variables, plus lags of commodity price ination, M2 growth, wage ination
and the spread between 10-year bond rates and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate.
In addition, we resort to the dataset studied in Orphanides (2003) spanning until 2002:4,
which contains real-timemeasures of ination and the output gap3. Thus, our results will also
reect information available for policymakers when decisions are made. We present results for
the full sample periods, as well as for a restricted sample period starting in 1979:3, as in Clarida
et al. (2000), coinciding with the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.
Table 1 reports the estimation results4. Some interesting features are worth pointing out.
First, results are fairly robust and consistent across the di¤erent types of data (ex-postor real-
time) employed in the estimation. Second, we obtain results largely similar to Clarida et al.
(2000) regarding the di¤erences in the estimated rules across the two sample periods. Indeed,
point estimates of the policy reaction to expected ination appears below the benchmark values
of 1 when the full sample is employed, whereas the estimated s appear signicantly larger
than 1 for the Volcker-Greenspan period. Interestingly, the real-timeestimates of the ination
coe¢ cient for the pre-1979 period are higher than with ex-postdata (and larger than 1 with
the CUE). This is consistent with the ndings of Orphanides (2003) and the suggestion that,
once policymakersreal-timeperception is taken into account, the Fed was more activist than
3See paper for details on the construction of the variables. We use the real-timeoutput gap measure shown
in Fig. 1 of Orphanides (2003, p. 997).
4Full estimates of (7) - available upon request - were qualitatively similar to those of (6), so we only report
results of the estimated discounting parameter, denoted as ':
5
previously thought.
As for the full sample estimates of ', the results are, in general, quite reasonable. The
implied average forecasting period ranges from 1 to 3 quarters. Estimates with the restricted
rule (') tend to be higher, most notably ex-postCUE estimates with the CBO gap, with an
unreasonable degree of forward-looking behavior. Note, however, that the J-test for overidenti-
fying restrictions for the full sample ex-postCUE produced somewhat low p-values for the
pre-Volcker period, which suggests that there may some problems with this specication for this
sample period.
However, if we consider the Volcker-Greenspan period, estimation results appear to be more
sensible. First, all coe¢ cients are statistically signicant and the J-test produces higher and
more reasonable p-values, despite the smaller sample. Secondly, the coe¢ cient on ination
expectations is estimated to be well above unity when the revised dataset is used, a result
consistent with the conclusion of Clarida et al. (2000) that the Fed adopted a more aggressive
stance in the combat to ination after 1979. With real-time variables, estimates of  are
somewhat lower, but consistent with the Taylor principle. Last, but not least, estimates of '
are higher than the full-sample ones, corresponding to point estimates of the targeting horizon
between 4 and 7 (again, results for ' are slightly larger, but within the same range). Note
that in all cases, one cannot reject values of ' that deliver targeting horizons between 4 and 8
quarters, but a targeting horizon of just 1 quarter is always comfortably rejected, suggesting a
high degree of forward-lookingness during the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.
For completeness, the stability properties of the our estimated rules were computed for a
standard New Keynesian model
t = Ett+1 + xt (8)
ct = Etct+1   1

(it   Ett+1);
where  = 0:99 is calibrated and Bayesian-estimated parameters, using US data, are  = 3:91
and  = 1:41 (see Batini et al. 2006). All estimated rules achieve saddlepath stability, and are
highly robust to variations in these values.5 The more aggressive responses to expected ination
in the Volcker-Greenspan era result in welfare outcomes that are considerably higher than the
estimated rules in the full sample period.
5Full results are available upon request.
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4 Conclusion
We show the empirical usefulness of Calvo rules by estimating the targeting horizon of the
Federal Reserve. Our results suggest that the practice of the Fed is consistent with a substantial
degree of forward-looking behavior, reinforcing previous ndings in the literature. Orphanides
and Wieland (2008), for example, show that Fed decisions are well captured by a forecast-based
policy rule, consistent with the Feds projections, rather than ex-postobserved outcomes. Our
framework complements this perspective by pinning down the degree of the Feds forward-
lookingness.
There are, however ways in which our analysis might be extended. Future work might
consider di¤erent targeting horizons for the feedback variables. However, given that an extra
coe¢ cient would have to be estimated, such rule would not be estimable in our single-equation
setup. On the other hand, we have also conned our analysis to US policymaking. The fact
that an increasing number of central banks now make publicly available their internal forecasts
for ination and GDP makes a cross country study viable.
References
[1] Andrews, D. W. K. (1991), Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance
Matrix Estimator, Econometrica, 59, 817-858.
[2] Batini, N., Justiniano, A., Levine, P. and Pearlman, J. (2006), Robust ination-forecast-
based rules to shield against indeterminacy, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
30, 1491-1526.
[3] Batini, N. and Nelson, E. (2001), Optimal horizons for ination targeting, Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 25, 891-910.
[4] Calvo, G. A. (1983), Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 12, 38398.
[5] Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M. (1998), Monetary policy rules in practice: some
international evidence, European Economic Review, 42, 1033-1067.
[6] Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M. (2000), Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic
Stability: Evidence and Some Theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 147-180
7
[7] Giannoni, M. P and Woodford, M. (2003), How Forward-Looking is Optimal Monetary
Policy?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 1425-1469.
[8] Levin, A., Wieland, V.. and Williams, J. C. (2003), The Performance of Forecast-Based
Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty, American Economic Review, 93, 622-
645.
[9] Levine, P., McAdam, P. and Pearlman, J. (2007), Ination Forecast Rules and Indeterm-
inacy: A Puzzle and a Resolution, International Journal of Central Banking, 3, 77-110.
[10] Newey, W. K. and Smith, R. J. (2004), Higher Order Properties of GMM and Generalized
Empirical Likelihood Estimators, Econometrica, 72, 219-255.
[11] Orphanides, A. (2003), Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 50, 983-1022.
[12] Orphanides, A. and Wieland, V. (2008), Economic Projections and Rules-of-Thumb for
Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 90, 307-24.
[13] Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
8
5 Appendix
Table 1: Estimates of the Calvo Rule, US Data
Revised data  '   J-test
(p value)
'
Full sample
Iterative GMM CBO output gap 0:841
(0:028)
0:592
(0:075)
0:720
(0:255)
0:207
(0:048)
0:857 0:743
(0:074)
Unemployment gap 0:791
(0:034)
0:484
(0:084)
0:716
(0:273)
0:172
(0:069)
0:772 0:700
(0:119)
CUE CBO output gap 0:898
(0:035)
0:600
(0:117)
0:794
(0:255)
0:120
(0:048)
0:138 0:971
(0:067)
Unemployment gap 0:892
(0:030)
0:509
(0:121)
0:772
(0:219)
0:119
(0:044)
0:150 0:606
(0:136)
Volcker-Greenspan sample
Iterative GMM CBO output gap 0:621
(0:051)
0:816
(0:046)
3:564
(0:59)
0:384
(0:152)
0:954 0:816
(0:056)
Unemployment gap 0:645
(0:052)
0:754
(0:056)
3:325
(0:558)
0:253
(0:106)
0:968 0:876
(0:041)
CUE CBO output gap 0:723
(0:074)
0:859
(0:080)
3:331
(1:206)
0:686
(0:360)
0:488 0:872
(0:103)
Unemployment gap 0:743
(0:072)
0:821
(0:087)
2:978
(1:016)
0:575
(0:258)
0:409 0:814
(0:085)
Real-timedata
Full sample
Iterative GMM 0:620
(0:056)
0:712
(0:058)
0:957
(0:170)
0:199
(0:071)
0:736 0:625
(0:058)
CUE 0:453
(0:081)
0:710
(0:060)
1:325
(0:187)
0:174
(0:039)
0:805 0:709
(0:066)
Volcker-Greenspan sample
Iterative GMM 0:480
(0:051)
0:871
(0:031)
1:201
(0:146)
0:195
(0:067)
0:841 0:871
(0:038)
CUE 0:706
(0:090)
0:754
(0:076)
1:633
(0:224)
0:200
(0:199)
0:996 0:804
(0:044)
Note: standard errors in brackets; ': Calvo mechanism on ination only (Eq. 7)
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